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Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA) is the largest and 
most ambitious public works program for poverty alleviation, adopted by Government of 
India since independence. It was implemented in year 2006, starting with the first phase of 
200 most backward districts in India. Two more consecutive phases were implemented to 
cover all rural regions in India but, even after almost 6 years of its implementation, it has not 
been adequately analyzed for its effect on various development indicators. This paper aims to 
study, whether participating in a typical employment guarantee program like MGNREGA, 
increases access to financial services and in particular, credit. Results provide evidence that, 
MGNREGA has been successful in self-selecting rural poor into participation and households 
participating longer in the program have been able to borrow more from formal sources. This 
paper also provides evidence that, increase in productivity of economic activities for 
participants, due to work in MGNREGA acts as a link between longer participation and 
increased access to formal credit. 	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1. INTRODUCTION 	  
Employment guarantee schemes (EGS) as a form of Public Work Programs (PWP) 
have been one of the crucial poverty alleviation policies in India, since independence. 
Role of PWP in times of economic distress and shocks have been widely advocated in 
academic literature see (Draze and Sen 1989) EGS in form of PWP have been looked 
upon as a policy, which ensures participation of poor population and helps them in 
stabilizing economic shocks by providing a guaranteed minimum level of livelihood 
security. Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme (MEGS) has been one of the 
most successful EGS in India. In 2005, National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(NREGA)2 was passed by parliament, which provides rural households, a guarantee 
of 100 days of employment in rural public works. MGNREGA adopted the model of 
MEGS in Maharashtra and is seen as one of the most ambitious EGS around the 
world.3 
This program has been a part of various policy discussions for poverty alleviation in 
India and elsewhere but even after completing almost 6 years of its implementation; it 
has not been adequately analyzed in terms of its impact on various development 
indicators. The goal of this paper is to provide a rigorous analysis of the ‘Effect of 
participating in MGNREGA on access to financial services (credit in particular) in 
rural India’. Some recent studies by (Johnson 2009) and (Uppal 2009) have attempted 
to analyze the role of MGNREGA in stabilizing weather-induced shocks and in 
providing better outcomes for children. However, to the best of my knowledge, no 
work has attempted to look at the potential positive impact of participating in an EGS 
on access to finance4for rural poor. This paper aims at filling the knowledge gap about 
potential effects of having a guaranteed source of livelihood on access to better 
financial services. 
 
This paper has three main objectives. First objective is to understand the potential link 
between employment security (and hence, income security) and increase in 
productivity that increases the demand for financial services. I have done a vast 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Was renamed as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA), 2005. 
3 Section (2) discusses MGNREGA in detail. 
4 Particularly, access to formal credit. 
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literature survey to understand the role of access to financial services in fostering 
economic development, which in turn is endogenously determined by access to 
productive work opportunities. Second objective is to analyze the success of 
providing employment guarantee in ensuring work availability to ‘only poor’5, at the 
time of need. To provide evidence for this objective, I have used extensive survey 
based literature and my own analysis for the sample of data under this study. Third 
and most important objective is to find evidence for potentially positive impact of a 
longer participation in EGS, on access to credit. 
 
Rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section (2) outlines the structure of 
MGNREGA. Section (3) discusses the relevant literature. Section (4) discusses the 
data and preliminary analysis on it, forms hypothesis and discusses econometric 
issues related to estimation and finally provides the estimation strategy and results. 
Section (5) presents some limitations of this study and section (6) concludes.
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Will analyze the economic status of the participating households.	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2. ABOUT THE PROGRAM: MGNREGA 	  
United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in 2005 passed the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA), which was later renamed as Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). In terms of outreach and 
budget layout, this program is the largest anti-poverty scheme launched by Indian 
government since independence. Under this act, every rural household in India is 
provided with a legal guarantee of 100 days of work in rural public work programs, at 
a minimum wage level (Government of India 2008). MGNREGA was launched in 
three different rollout phases. First phase commenced in year 2006 with 200 most 
backward districts in India. All other districts in country were covered under the 
scheme over two consecutive phases in year 2007 and 2008. 
Under MGNREGA, all rural households who are willing to take up unskilled labor 
are required to register with their respective village council (called gram panchayas) 
and are issued with a Job card. After receiving the job card, a household can demand 
work anytime and will be provided employment within 15 days of expressing 
demand, else will be compensated with a daily unemployment allowance 
(Government of India 2008). Most of the rural public works conducted under 
MGNREGA fall under the category of developing and maintaining community assets 
like water bodies, community land, basic infrastructure etc (Government of India 
2008). In some cases (See section 3), rural households belonging to backward castes 
are allowed to perform work on their own fields. This work includes improving 
irrigation facilities, water harvesting, land cleaning etc. 
Looking at some national level figures of MGNREGA implementation for 2009-10 
(MGNREGA Outcomes for 2009 - 2010, 2011), It is observed that 52.5 million 
households were provided employment with an aggregate of 2828 million person days 
generated. Average person days per household were little above 50.  
This study uses a sample of districts from the state of Andhra Pradesh in southern 
India (see section 4). Looking at the performance of Andhra Pradesh in terms of 
MGNREGA implementation (MGNREGS outcomes for AP, 2011), It is observed 
that, in fiscal year 2009-10, around 6.2 million households were provided 
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employment under MGNREGA with 404.4 million person days of employment 
generated6. Andhra Pradesh has been frontrunner in its performance in terms of 
MGNREGA implementation (Mehrotra 2008) and is also leading in terms of 
providing all wage payments data for public access on its website (MGNREGA 
Outcomes for 2009 - 2010, 2011). It has also been commended for adopting efficient 
















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  All figures are cumulative till the latest month reported in 2009-10 
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3. BACKGROUND RESEARCH AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
This section deals with literature review and background research on issues of 
interest, which creates the groundwork for my hypothesis in following sections. 
Section 3.1 discusses theoretical models relating to vulnerability and consumption 
smoothing for poor population in developing nations. Section 3.2 discusses empirical 
literature regarding employment guarantee schemes and poverty in developing 
nations. In section 3.2.1 I will discuss the employment guarantee schemes (EGS) and 
their potential for screening the poor from non-poor and self-selection of poor in 
participation. Section 3.2.2 relates to the issue of employment generation in EGS and 
their direct/indirect effects on productivity of economic activities of rural poor. 
Section 3.3.3 discusses the importance of ‘access to finance’ for economic 
development and conditions which provide a conducive environment for financial 
development. Finally, section 3.3.4 provides a summary of findings in these sub-
sections and develops a potential link between ‘participation in EGS’ and ‘access to 
finance’. 
 
3.1 Theoretical Literature 	  
This section will focus on utility maximizing strategies of poor households under 
different constraints. I will discuss the theoretical literature relating to how a typical 
poor household depends on transitory income for maximizing its welfare and the issue 
of credit constraints in this regard. The ability to smooth one’s consumption allows 
households to deal with risks overtime and with adverse income shocks. According to 
(Friedman 1957), fluctuation in household consumption caused by shocks to income 
can be stabilized over time by borrowing against future. Households can borrow when 
they are faced with ‘transitory low income’ (negative income shock) and can repay 
the borrowings when they have ‘transitory high income’ (positive income shock). 
Borrowing against future assumes perfect capital markets, where there are no 
information asymmetries and agents can perfectly borrow or lend at market 
determined interest rates. Theory also says that temporary changes in income 
(transitory income) are uncorrelated with permanent income and permanent 
consumption. 
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However, in most developing economies around the world, capital markets are not 
perfect due to heavy distortions caused by asymmetric information problems and thus, 
these economies tend to be characterized by credit constraints and credit rationing 
[(Morduch 1995) and (Conning and Udry 2007)]. Borrowings are dependent on future 
earning capabilities of households and under imperfect financial markets, they ‘may 
not’ be able to signal their earning ability and hence borrow enough to stabilize their 
consumption. Therefore, faced with income shocks and the inability to signal a 
‘positive income capability’ in future, households cannot borrow and are credit 
constrained. (Doan, Gibson & Mark 2010; Morduch 1995); (Doan and Mark 2011) 
and (Morduch 1995) identify that, dependency of household consumption on not only 
the permanent but also transitory income and the inability to borrow, makes them 
credit-constrained.  
Looking at the role of access to credit in utility maximization of poor (and risk-
averse) households; (Binswanger 1980) in his experimental studies finds that, 
difference in investment behavior of similarly endowed (technology) poor households 
cannot be entirely attributed to the difference in risk-aversion. These differences can 
only be explained when various household characteristics like access to credit, 
marketing, transfer benefit programs and other institutional arrangements are taken 
into account. (Eswaran and Kotwal 1986) use an expected utility framework and find 
that risk preferences (and in turn the investment behavior) are determined by resource 
constraints and capital market imperfections. Difference in risk behaviors may not 
just be the outcome of difference in preferences but may be due to access to different 
resources, institutions and external assistance. 
In this discussion of theoretical literature, it is observed that access to credit is a key 
determinant of household investment behavior and credit constraints are determined 
by access to earning opportunities in future. Income from these opportunities might be 
income from employment, transfer benefits etc., which are not transitory and would 
sustain through time to signal a better earning capability, which allows households to 
borrow against their future. In light of these arguments, next sub-section will discuss a 
potential relationship between employment guarantee schemes (EGS) and access to 
credit; showing how they can provide better economic status to poor households. 
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3.2 Empirical Literature 
 
3.2.1 Employment Guarantee Schemes (EGSs) and targeting of poor population 	  
This sub-section will discuss the literature on benefits of an EGS another transfer 
schemes aimed at tackling poverty. It will focus on the importance of ensuring self-
selection of poor in EGSs so that transfer benefits are not leaked out to non-poor. It 
will also discuss the welfare effects of employment generation in an EGS. 
Rural Public Work (RPW) programs are one of the crucial policy instruments for 
poverty alleviation in India (Ninno, Subbarao and Milazzo 2009) and have been used 
extensively in various forms since independence. EGS are special form of RPW 
programs, which provides guaranteed minimum level of employment in RPW and 
participants are paid according to a minimum wage threshold (Murgai and Ravallion 
2005). RPW are advocated because they overcome some of the limitations of a 
straightforward cash transfer program or an asset redistribution program (land in 
particular). Programs like unconditional cash transfers, land redistributions etc. might 
not be successful in targeting the benefits exclusively to poor population (Gaiha and 
Imai 2006). (Ravallion 1991) elaborates on the issue of ‘imperfect coverage of the 
poor’ and ‘leakage to non-poor’ in transfer schemes and finds that ‘self-selection’ of 
poor into these schemes is the most effective measure to overcome these limitations.  
With perfect information on individual earning abilities, policymakers can identify 
poor and target the benefits accordingly. However, it is unlikely and costly to gauge 
this information. At best, it is possible to identify some indicators of poverty like 
lower landholdings, standard of living etc, see (Ravaillon 1989) and (Datt and 
Ravallion 1994) for survey of evidence. This ‘Information Asymmetry’ prevents 
screening of poor from non-poor and therefore, provides constraints on targeting the 
benefits to poor. Targeting can be improved by imposing costs on participants, which 
are increasing in their incomes (unobserved). These costs should be equal to the 
‘value of forgone alternative’ and this will ensure participation of people with ‘value 
of foregone alternative’ less than the benefits from participation. In case of poor 
people (for whom one would expect the value of foregone alternative to be lower), a 
level of benefit can be designed which ensures participation of only poor. In non-
agricultural seasons when there is a shortage of alternative employment for poor 
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peasants, a work requirement in RPW with benefits close to a minimum wage level 
(to exclude non-poor) would self-select poor into participation [(Datt and Ravallion 
1994); (Ninno, Subbarao and Milazzo 2009)]. Guaranteeing a level of work will help 
poor make informed decisions on their expected income from participation. This way 
an EGS not only transfers benefits to poor but also ensures the concentration of 
benefits to poor only.  
Looking at the employment generation; it is argued that employment generated in 
EGS might compete with existing work opportunities, which might distort market 
allocations (Song and Philip 2010). A careful investigation by [(Dandekar, 1983); 
(Binswanger, et al. 1984); (Subbarao 1989)] suggests that distortions will take place 
when existing labor markets are functioning efficiently before the EGS is 
implemented. But these efficiency conditions are not present in backward sections of 
a developing economy that are characterized by exploitative labor relations, 
discriminatory wage differentials and gender biases in labor market. EGS helps in 
breaking down the non-efficient nature of labor markets and when enforced by law, 
ensures guaranteed employment and wages, better working conditions, no gender 
discrimination and non-exploitative nature of work relations.  
There are empirical evidences about self-selection of poor in the EGS from one of the 
Indian schemes called ‘Maharashtra Employment Guarantee Scheme’ (MEGS), 
launched in 1970-73 [(Dandekar and Sathe 1980); (Datt and Ravallion 1994); 
(Acharya and Panwalkar 1988); (Walker and James 1990); (Bhende, et al. 1992)]. 
They find that, majority of participants (around 90 percent) were below poverty line 
(BPL)7 and participation decreased rapidly with increase in household wealth. It is 
evident from recent surveys of MGNREGA and in government reports that large 
proportion of participants in MGNEGA belongs to lower castes, which are 
economically backward (Mehrotra 2008). In a recent study, (Uppal 2009) finds that 
probability of registering for participation in MGNREGA has a negative relation 
(statistically significant) with household wealth. These evidences suggest that EGS in 
India have been successful in targeting the program towards poor through their 
efficient system of self-selection.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  BPL is a classification of households surviving on less than an income threshold of $ 1 (45 Indian 
National Rupee-INR) per day. 
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These studies [(Dandekar and Manju, Employment Guarantee Scheme and Food for 
Work Programme 1980); (Datt and Ravallion 1994); (Acharya and Panwalkar 1988); 
(Wallker and James 1990); (Bhende, et al. 1992)] find that most of the employment 
was generated in agricultural slack season (from april-june) for a decade of 1980-
1990. (Johnson 2009) in his study of NREGA’s affect on weather related shocks in 
Andhra Pradesh provides evidence that flexible workfare programs help poor 
households cope better with weather related instabilities in income. These evidences 
suggest that employment was taken up in periods when there were less alternative 
work opportunities (expected value of forgone alternative was very low) and 
therefore, poor were self-selected in these schemes. 
Section (4.2.2) of the paper will further analyze MGNREGA on ground of self-
selection in the scheme. 
 
3.2.2 Effect of EGS on employment generation and productivity growth 	  
This sub-section will discuss survey evidences from EGS in India and Bangladesh, 
and will elaborate on positive effects of participating in EGS on aggregate 
productivity. 
EGS in India have been designed to provide transfer benefits to poor people, for 
which they are required to work in RPW. This work involves development and 
management of assets in village communities (Mehrotra 2008) and various surveys 
from past sections). Work for development of community assets in villages has 
indirect benefits on productivity apart from direct wage benefits. Assets such as better 
irrigation facilities, water conservation avenues, and rural infrastructure have positive 
effects on aggregate productivity of agriculture (which is source of income for 
majority of population in rural areas). It is evident from various surveys of EGS in 
Indian (MEGS) and Bangladesh (Food for Work Program, FFWP) that, improvement 
in agricultural productivity due to improved irrigation sources and land productivity 
brought sizable gains in farm output [(Dandekar & Sathe 1980); (Ahmed and Hossain 
1987); (Chowdhury and Asaduzzaman 1983)].  
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Talking about MGNREGA, let us first see the nature of work being conducted. 
(nrega.net 2009) provides useful insight into work patterns in India. Work in 
MGNREGA is divided into two broad categories of: 1). Work on community land and 
2). Work on private land. Second category of work is only allowed for Scheduled 
castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST), other backward castes (OBC), BPL farmers and 
beneficiaries of various land reform programs by government8. Works on community 
land involve water conservation, water harvesting, irrigation, drought proofing, 
maintenance of tanks and canals and other works to develop rural infrastructure. 
Work on private land involves developing irrigation facilities in own farms, cleaning 
of land and horticulture plantation. Looking at the data provided by (MGNREGA 
Outcomes for 2009 - 2010,  2011) it can be seen that water conservation has 
accounted for around 50% of total works in MGNREGA in fiscal years 2006-2011. 
Also, work on private land has increased from 10% of the total works in 2006-07 to 
20% in 2009-10.  
Looking at increases in agricultural productivity, The Centre for Science and 
Environment (NREGA: Opportunities and Challenges 2008) conducted a survey in 
two MGNREGA participating states in India and found that, around 55% of its 
respondents reported an increase of 150 hectares of land under crops. Also, 80% of 
respondents agree that MGNREGA has led to increased water availability. Study 
by(ISWSD 2006) reports increased ground water level and stabilization of crop cycles 
through timely provision of water, in eight different states participating in 
MGNREGA. 
Efforts to incorporate steps towards achieving convergence in MGNREGA and 
various other programs of Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) have been a part of the 
implementation policy since the inception of MGNREGA (Notifications RBI/2005-
06/204 2005). Under the plans of convergence, MGNREGA works are focused on 
specific targets outlined by the previous schemes of MOA. Hence, we can see that 
productivity-augmenting affects of work in MGNREGA are not exogenous to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Small and marginal farmers account for 80% of land-holdings and operate 40% of cultivated land in 
India, of which SC/ST/OBS form a major proportion and majority of small and marginal farmers fall 
under BPL category and SC and ST have accounted for around 50% of total participation in 
MGNREGA from 2006-2011 
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implementation, whereas they serve as an evidence of indirect effects of participating 
in the program. 
 
3.3.3 Access to Finance: Benefits and Issues 	  
Access to good financial resources (services) is an important ingredient for economic 
development. Access to financial services not only enables poor households to 
improve their socio-economic well-being by investing more in health, education and 
productive assets, but also provides them ability to make best use of economic 
opportunities. Lack of access to financial services for low-income households 
reinforces the vicious circle of poverty; making it difficult for households to borrow 
against their future. As a result, they are not able to engage in productive economic 
opportunities and at the same time are not able to invest in health and education of the 
household members. (Rutherford 2000) argues that poor need access to financial 
services on a larger scale than rich because they have no access to these services. 
Providing the poor with access to finance might have larger returns than that of non-
poor because starting from low or no access to credit, the poor will have increasing 
marginal utility from credit.  
[World Savings Bank Institute(WSBI) 2004)] reports that only 20% of the population 
in developing economies has access to formal financial services. In Indian context, 
where Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has been involved in various schemes of 
providing access to finance to rural regions (Notifications RBI/2005-06/204 2005) the 
concept of financial exclusion (no access to formal financial services) does not seem 
to be that of complete financial exclusion. It fits better in the category of ‘partial 
access to finance’, where people (mostly poor) have access to some basic financial 
product/s (like savings account in a bank) but lack access to formal credit services. 
This class of financially excluded sections largely comprises of marginal farmers, 
landless laborers, and ethnic minorities (Promote No-frills Accounts 2006). 
Credit constraints have a direct relation with lower productivity and therefore lower 
income. Due to lack of credit, small and marginal farmers are not able to invest in 
farm productivity and they largely depend on self-finance and informal credit, which 
has inefficiencies of its own (McKinnon 1973). Lack of access to formal credit 
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services leads to limited investment that in turn results in low scale of existing 
economic activities. Caps on limit of self-financing and informal sources prevent the 
poor households from taking advantage of potentially high return investment 
opportunities (Fernando 2007).  India compares favorably with other developing 
countries in terms of average population served per bank branch, owing to increased 
outreach of rural bank branches in 1970-2003 (Basu 2006). Despite its favorable 
position, India suffers from large-scale exclusion of poor households and marginal 
farmers from formal financial loop. As observed in surveys by World Bank (RFAS 
2003), large fraction of marginal (87%) and small farmers (70%) does not have access 
to formal bank credit and around 45% of the surveyed households reported informal 
borrowings for at least once in preceding year. Average interest rate on such informal 
borrowings is as high as 48% per year.  
(Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993) and (Fafchamps and Pender 1997) analyze household 
investment decision in profitable agricultural technologies and importance of this 
behavior for poverty dynamics. They find that non-convex nature of production 
technology and presence of credit constraints result in a poverty trap. (Dercon 1998) 
studies investment in cattle in rural Africa and finds that poor households do not 
invest in risky (but profitable) productive assets as they are unable to finance their 
investment by lump-sum borrowings. (Carter and Ikegami 2009) and (Barrett, Carter 
and Ikegami 2008) extend this model by allowing for heterogeneous nature of ability 
and productivity of households. They find that less productive (lower ability) 
households will remain in poverty regardless of the level of initial assets. These 
studies establish the importance of financial development for coming out of poverty 
trap and for economic development.  
But, is the level of financial development in an economy, independent of existing 
economic opportunities? 
(Bianchi 2009) analyzes the complementarily between labour and financial markets 
by looking at endogeniety of financial development on imperfect information and 
availability of economic opportunities, which in turn depend on the level of financial 
development. Their results emphasize that financial development fosters economic 
development but it is difficult for the process of financial development to occur 
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exogenously. Process of financial development is contingent on availability of 
productive economic opportunities for efficient investment of capital.  
Looking at findings from these studies and the data on state of financial inclusion in 
India; we can see that exclusion of small and marginal farmers from formal financial 
loop (credit in particular) suggests that, keeping aside the supply side constraints, 
poor households do not have access to productive economic opportunities that can 
generate high returns and foster their demand for formal credit. They demand flexible 
credit for consumption and contingency purposes, the need for which are more 
frequent and are better served by informal moneylenders (Bardhan and Rudra 1978). 
Access to formal credit for poor households is potentially constrained by lack of 
productive economic activities, which can generate returns, well enough to finance 
their consumption expenditures and repay loans. As noted by (Zingales and Rajan 




In first two sub-sections, we have seen that EGS (if implemented perfectly), will self-
select poor into participation and will provide employment, which has direct welfare 
benefit of cash transfer and indirect benefit of productivity gains from work 
conducted in EGS. In third sub-section, we saw the importance of access to financial 
services in fostering economic development in an economy. It was evident from the 
literature that, financial development fosters economic development but financial 
development cannot come up on its own; it needs supportive environment of 
productive economic opportunities. Economic opportunities like EGS, which provides 
monetary benefits along with indirect benefits of productivity gains can be looked 
upon as those opportunities. With more productive land holdings and increase in 
cropped area, farmers can revise their investment decisions in favor of more 
productive farm inputs. Increased demand for formal credit and introduction of more 
avenues for financial inclusion by central bank would result in an increase in take-up 
of formal credit by poor households. This potential link of ‘participation in EGS’ and 
‘access to financial services’ forms the groundwork for my hypothesis in following 
sections. 
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4. DATA AND METHODLOLGY 	  
4.1 Data 	  
This paper uses two data sets; first the ‘Access to Finance (ATF) survey in Andhra 
Pradesh (AP)’, conducted by Centre for Microfinance, India and second, data on 
aggregate wage payments in MGNREGA for Andhra Pradesh in period 2006-2009.  
The data on ATF survey in AP comes from CMF and BIRD (Bankers institute for 
Rural Development, NABARD)’s initiative in year 2009 to measure access to 
financial services in Andhra Pradesh. This data contains various variables relating to 
access to financial services (formal loans, informal loans, loans from microcredit 
organizations, chit-funds etc.) and detailed information on assets and characteristics 
of households. Under this survey, 1920 households were randomly selected for 
surveying using a three stage sampling design in which first 8 districts, then 64 
villages, and then 1920 households were randomly selected. 
The wage payments data of MGNREGA was collected and compiled by Centre for 
Microfinance-IFMR Research (India) from official MGNREGA website (mention 
website) using automated software scripts. This data captures information on each 
weekly payroll released for work completed by each participant (belonging to a single 
job card issues to a household) over the period 2006-20099. I have selected the 
districts included in ATF survey and compiled them to generate averages of days 
worked and amount received by year, months and rollout phases. 




 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Only first half of fiscal year 2009. 10	  See <http://www.ifmr.ac.in/cmf/resources.html>	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4.2 Preliminary Analysis 	  
In this section I will present some basic analysis from ‘Aggregate MGNREGA data’ 
and from ‘Access to Finance survey data (ATF)’. First, I will discuss some 
participation statistics from aggregate MGNREGA data and next, will move on to 
some selected statistics from ATF data related to participation in MGNREGA and 
loan usage of households.  
 
4.2.1 Aggregate MGNREGA data for AP 	  
Starting with ‘Aggregate MGNREGA’ data, (Table 1) represents the districts in 
Andhra Pradesh (AP) classified by their inclusion in different phases of MGNREGA 
implementation.  (13) out of a total (22) districts in AP were included in first phase of 
MGNREGA implementation followed by inclusion of (6) and (3) districts in second 
and third phases respectively. Districts, which were the part of surveyed sample in 
ATF data, are highlighted in red; six out of total eight districts were in first phase and 
one each in second and third phase. I have selected the districts and villages included 
in ATF data from aggregate MGNREGA data and will be referring to only this 
selected part as ‘MGNREGA data’.  
 
- Participation in MGNREGA 
It will be interesting to analyze the year-wise pattern of employment generated in 
program for each set of districts included in three consecutive phases and see if 
employment has increased for years after the program was first implemented. (Figure 
1) depicts a bar chart, which plots average number of employment days for districts 
included in different phases, over the period 2006-2008.11 It shows that average 
number of days have increased for phase-1 districts (in 2006) over the period 2006-
2008. Same pattern is observed for phase-2 districts (in 2007) over the period 2007-
2008. Average days for phase-3 districts (in 2008) have also increased from 2008 to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Fiscal year 2009-10 was in progress when this data was aggregated; hence year 2009 has not been 
included due to unavailability of full data for year 2009-10. 
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halfway in 2009 and would have increased more in next half of 200912. This figure 
shows that average days of employment in MGNREGA have been increasing over the 
years for each set of districts in different implementation phases. To see if 
employment days are statistically different between phases of implementation, I have 
tested the significance of difference in average days for different phases using t-
statistic for year 2007 (one year after the implementation of first phase) and year 
2008. Table-2 reports the results of test. It is observed that, phase-1 districts generated 
more employment in comparison to phase-2 and phase-3 districts. Also phase-2 
districts generated more employment days in comparison to phase-3 districts. All 
differences are statistically significant at 0.1% significance level (p<0.001).  
I have performed similar analysis for average aggregate income from participation for 
each set of districts included in three consecutive phases. Figure 2 depicts the trend, 
which shows that average aggregate wages from participation increased for phase-1 
and phase-2 districts and phase-3 districts show an increase from 2008 to half way 
2009 (not shown in figure). 
Table 3 reports the significance test for difference in aggregate income from 
participation between different phases. Phase-1 districts generated more income 
compared to phase-2 and phase-3 districts, while phase-2 generated more income 
compared to phase-3 districts. All differences are significant at 0.01% significance 
level (p<0.001).  
 
- MGNREGA as a flexible scheme in providing employment guarantee 
Next step is to see how the participation varies by months in a year. By law, any 
household registered in MGNREGA can demand work at any time of the year. 
(Johnson 2009) identifies the importance of this flexibility in providing employment 
guarantee to ensure that poor participants can compensate for income shocks as and 
when they face them. Looking at previous studies (see Section 3), we have seen that 
most of the employment is generated in agricultural slack season. Figure 3 shows the 
bar chart of average total MGNREGA wages (as a proxy of average employment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Not shown in graph. 
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generated) for phase-1 districts in 2008 (when they have completed three years of 
implementation) over months in a year. Figure 4 shows the average total rainfall in 
AP by months for phase-1 districts over the period of eight years (2001-2008). These 
figures show that most of the employment is generated in period from January to May 
(Figure 3) and that time is marked by lower average rainfall in a year (Figure 4). 
(Johnson 2009) call this period from December-May as ‘lean season’ because outside 
this period (June-Nov), farmers are busy in their fields growing paddy (which requires 
high level of rainfall). It is observed that most of the employment generated in 
MGNREGA is during the agricultural lean season when farmers are not occupied in 
their fields and might be looking for alternative employment options. Flexibility in 
MGNREGA ensures that participants get work when they demand and the highest 
demand is in agricultural slack season. 
From these sets of analysis, it is observed that firstly, aggregate participation 
(measured by days and income) in MGNREGA has increased over the years. These 
results indicate that there is increasing demand for work as time progresses and more 
districts are included. Also, this demand for work remains higher for districts included 
in initial phases. Secondly, most of the employment is generated in agricultural slack 
season when farmers are looking for alternative employment opportunities. It shows 
that MGNREGA in AP as an act of law has been successful in providing flexibility of 
choosing days of employment and aggregate participation has increased in districts, 
which have spent more time under the implementation. Thus, the program created 
jobs when there were less or no alternative work opportunities. It provided work and 
income that otherwise would not have been available and hence, represents an 
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4.2.2 Access to Finance survey in AP 
 
- Self-Selection of poor in MGNREGA 
As seen in Section 3, majority of participants in EGS belong to lower castes (like SC, 
ST and OBC). One should expect the similar pattern in the ATF data. Table 4 reports 
the percentage of population belonging to different castes for both aggregate ATF 
data and for households participating in MGNREGA. It can be seen that majority of 
population participating in MGNREGA belongs to SC, ST or OBS caste and their 
percentage in total sample increases when compared to aggregate data. This indicates 
that participation in MGNREGA is mainly driven by lower castes, which are reported 
to be amongst the poorest (see Section 3). 
(Uppal 2009) analyzes the participation in MGNREGA for a different sample of 
districts in AP and finds that households who are economically backward and belong 
to lower castes are more likely to register for participation in MGNREGA. Because of 
lack of a baseline data of ATF sample before the implementation of MGNREGA, 
comparing participation on basis of observable economic variables will be biased, as 
value of these variables will be endogenously determined by prior period of 
participation and income earned in MGNREGA.  
However, some variables like caste of household, literacy level of household head and 
religion are not likely to change overtime. Caste and religion of a household are time 
invariant variables, while literacy level might change overtime. Figure 5 plots the 
density graph of the age of household (mean age is 46), it can be seen from the graph 
that majority of household heads are middle-aged or older. Literacy level of people in 
their middle age or older is less likely to change over time hence; it would not be 
biased to include literacy level of household head as independent variable in the 
analysis. As per previous discussion in section (3.2.1) and table 4, household 
belonging to lower castes and households whose head are ranked lower on literacy 
rating are more likely to be economically worse and hence, more likely to participate 
in MGNREGA. 
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I will use a probit-estimation of participation in MGREGA (a dummy of 
participation) as dependent variable and caste of household, religion of household and 
literacy level of household head as regressors; controlling for implementation phases 
and district fixed effects (Model 1). Districts included in phase-1 were selected on 
being amongst 200 most backward districts in 2006; hence similar analysis is being 
done for districts included in phase-1 using interaction of Phase-1 dummy and 
dummy of participation. The models to be estimated are as follows: 
 
(DNREGA)i = αi + β1(CBC)i + β2(L)i+β3(R)i +β4(P1) + β4(P2) + β4 (DFE) +εi   (1) 
(DNREGA x P1)i = αi + β1(CBC)i+ β2(L)i+β3(R)i +β4(P1) + β4(P2) + β4 (DFE) +εi (2) 
 
Where, DNREGA is the Dummy for participation in MGNREGA with value 1 if 
household participates in MGNREGA and 0 if household does not participate in 
MGNREGA; (DNREGA x P1) is the interaction dummy for participation in MGNREGA 
and being in Phase-1 districts; (CBC) is the dummy variable with value 1 if household 
belongs to SC, ST or OBC caste; (L)i is the literacy level of household head (dummies 
for different literacy level); (R)i is the religion of household (dummies for different 
religion);  (P1) & (P2) are dummies for, if household belongs to phase-1 or phase-2 
districts, respectively; (DFE) are district fixed effects and εi is the random (IID) error 
term.  
Table 5 reports the result of probit-estimation. For aggregate data (column 1); 
coefficient on caste dummy (CBC) is positive and significant at 0.1% significance 
level (p< 0.001). For literacy level, coefficient on category ‘signature only’ and ‘can 
not read or write’ are positive and significant at 0.1% significance level (p<0.001). 
Similar results are observed for phase-1 participants (Model 2). These results are 
robust to inclusion of district fixed effects.13 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  District	  fixed	  effects	  not	  shown	  in	  estimation	  table.	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These results suggests that probability for participating in MGNREGA increases if 
household belongs to a lower caste (SC/ST/OBC) with respect to base category of 
‘General’ (higher caste) and this probability increases if household is in one of the 
phase-1 districts.  Similarly, probability of participating in MGNREGA increases for 
households whose head do ‘signature only’ or ‘can not read or write at all’ with 
respect to base category of ‘Can read and Write’. This probability increases for 
households in phase-1 districts.  
Households who belong to a lower caste or those whose head is less literate/illiterate 
have higher probability of choosing to participate in MGNREGA. It is evident that 
economically backward households are more likely to participate in MGNREGA and 
hence, MGNREGA has been successful in implementing self-selection of poor by 
putting a work requirement for getting transfer benefits. This endogeneity of 
MGNREGA implementation is discussed in detail in next section. 
  
-State of financial inclusion in survey districts 
The ATF survey provides information on usage of loans taken from formal (Bank and 
other registered financial institutions) or informal sources (friends, relatives, 
neighbors, village moneylender etc.). Four most common usages of loans for both 
formal and informal categories are: ‘buying agricultural machinery or input’, 
‘repaying old debt’, ‘health expenditures’ and ‘household consumption’. Table 6 
reports the percentage of loans from formal/informal category, falling in each usage 
category.  
Some interesting facts can be observed, which reveal the credit demand for 
households participating in MGNREGA, for both formal and informal sources. For 
loans from formal sources, the most common usage is ‘For buying agricultural 
machinery or input’ (59% of total). For loans from informal sources, the most 
common usages are ‘For household consumption’ (27%), the second most common 
being ‘For health expenditures’ (25%).  
Comparing both categories of loan sources, we can see that formal loans are mainly 
used to finance agricultural investment, while informal loans are financing household 
consumption expenditures and health expenses. Investment in farm requires a large 
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amount, which cannot usually be financed by loan from an informal source. Hence, 
households prefer to depend more on formal sources for their agricultural investment 
needs. Whereas, uses like ‘household consumption’ and ‘health expenditures’ 
represent economic shock in a household, which are not periodic in nature and facing 
these shocks, household is in need of immediate credit. Hence, they rely more on 
informal sources, which, though costly but depend on personal relations with the 
lender and therefore ensures immediate availability of credit (Bardhan and Rudra 
1978).  
The ATF survey also provides information on a nearly exhaustive list of reasons for 
not taking/receiving a loan from formal and informal sources. The categories of 
reasons vary between formal and informal sources. Three most common reasons for 
not receiving a loan from formal sources are: ‘Loan application rejected’, ‘No 
information about loan products from formal source’ and ‘Already have or could get a 
loan from other source/s’. Similarly, three most common reasons for not receiving a 
loan from informal sources are: ‘High interest rates’, ‘Irregular income flow/low 
repayment capability’ and ‘Already have or could get a loan from other source/s’.  
Table 7 reports percentage of most common responses for not taking a loan from 
formal sources. The most common reason for not receiving a loan from formal source 
is ‘No information about loan products from formal source’ (20%). It shows that, it is 
due to lack of information about the loan product that households are not able to avail 
loans from formal sources. Table 8 reports percentage of most common responses for 
not taking a loan from informal sources.  
The most common reason for not receiving a loan from an informal source is 
‘Irregular income flow/low repayment capability’ (41%). It shows that, majority of 
households do not have regular income and good repayment capability, due to which 
they are not able to get an informal loan. 
ATF survey contains information on why a household has not taken a formal bank 
account. It is interesting to analyze the response of all surveyed households in 
aggregate and compare it with households participating in MGNREGA. Most 
common reasons for not taking a formal bank account are: ‘Not enough money to 
save in bank’, ‘Do not want/need a bank account’, ‘No information about formal bank 
account’, ‘Do not have proper documentation’. Table 9 reports the percentage of most 
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common reasons for not taking a formal bank account for aggregate data and for 
households participating in MGNREGA.  
The most common reason for not taking a bank account is ‘Not enough money to save 
in bank’ (10%), while the same percentage for MGNREGA participants is (4%). For 
MGNREGA participants, a very few percentage of respondents report a reason for not 
having a bank account (13%) while the corresponding percentage for aggregate data 
is (28%). MGNREGA participants are paid their wages through a formal bank/post 
office account hence; they are already under the basic level of financial inclusion.  
 
  - Effect of basic financial inclusion on formal borrowings 
It might happen that by holding a bank account and transacting in it, a household 
becomes aware of government credit schemes or feel confident about working with 
bank systems. So, there are reasons to believe that holding an account to receive 
government transfer benefits might increase their chances of getting a formal credit 
from bank.  
The ATF data asks respondents if they have any loans outstanding from any formal 
source. I will use this variable as proxy for, whether a household has taken out any 
formal credit. The data includes information on whether a household has a bank 
account to receive government benefits. I will use a probit-estimation to find out if 
‘having a formal loan’ is determined by household ‘having an account to receive 
government benefits’. I will control for aggregate amount of informal savings by a 
household (savings at home, with friends and neighbors etc.) and for a breadth of 
household control variables like, assets (landholdings, jewelry and other small assets 
like pressure cooker, fan, cooking energy source, mobile phone, sewing machine, 
almirah etc.) and also for various household characteristics like caste, religion, level 
of education and gender of household head. The model is as follows: 
(DFORMAL)i = αi + β1 (AGOVT.)i+β2(Exp)i+ β3(SaveInfor)i+β4(C)i +β5(L)i+β6(R)i + 
β7(G)i +β8[HH]i +εi                                  (3) 
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Where, (DFORMAL) is the dummy for having a formal loan outstanding with value 1 if 
household has a loan outstanding from a formal source and 0 if they do not have any 
formal loan outstanding; (AGOVT.) is the dummy for having a formal bank account for 
receiving government transfer benefits with value 1 if household has a formal bank 
account for receiving government benefits and 0 if they do not have; (Exp)i is 
household consumption expenditure in past 30 days of survey; (SaveInfor)i records the 
amount of informal savings a household has; (C)i is the dummy variable for caste of 
household; (L)i is the literacy level of household head (dummies for different literacy 
level); (R)i is the religion of household (dummies for different religion); [HH]i is the 
vector of household level control variables described above.  
Table 10 reports the result of this probit estimation. It is observed that coefficient on 
(AGOVT) is positive and significant at 5% significance level; Coefficient on (Exp) is 
positive and significant (though very small in magnitude); Coefficient on 
landholdings is positive and significant at 0.01% significance level; Coefficient on 
caste variable (C) is positive and significant at 1% significance level for ‘Other 
Backward Caste (OBC)’ and ‘General’ with ‘Scheduled Caste (SC) as base category’. 
Coefficient on gender (G) is negative and significant at 0.01% significance level with 
‘Male’ as a base category. 
These results suggest that a household having a formal bank account for receiving 
government transfer benefits is more likely to receive a loan from formal source. It 
provides evidence for my hypothesis that having a formal bank account for receiving 
government benefits might have positive effect on chances of getting a loan from a 
formal source. This might work from various channels like positive effect of 
transacting in a formal bank account on awareness about loan products, confidence 
about banking procedures or they might be offered some credit product by bank 
through their already existing account in bank. But it is not possible for me to analyze 
them in detail because of the lack of data on formal bank accounts. There are some 
other interesting observations like households belonging to upper caste are more 
likely to receive a loan from a formal source and households with a female head are 
less likely to receive a formal loan. These results are robust to inclusion of district 
fixed effects. 
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4.2.3 Summary 	  
It is observed in this section that participation in MGNREGA has increased overtime 
since its inception and participation remains significantly higher in districts, which 
were included in initial phases. This analysis also provides evidence that MGNREGA 
has been flexible in providing employment to households when they are in need of it; 
participation increases during agricultural slack season when households are looking 
for alternative employment opportunities. Analysis on ATF data reports some 
important data on financial inclusion in surveyed districts. It provides evidence that 
MGNREGA has been successful in implementing policies for self-selecting poor 
households in the scheme. It also provides evidence that basic financial inclusion 
brought about by opening bank accounts (to a large extent for MGNREGA benefits) 
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4.3 Hypothesis 	  
In this section, I will look back at previous discussions and form my hypothesis.  
In Section (3.2.2 and 4.2.2), we have seen that EGS increases agricultural productivity 
and most of the loans from formal source are used for agricultural purposes; hence a 
link between participation in MGNREGA and access to credit is plausible. 
Households participating in MGNREGA and working to enhance the agricultural 
productivity earn wages, which along with increased agricultural productivity should 
increase the demand for credit.  
It was observed in a t-test of land currently under agricultural production that 
households included in phase-1 districts had significantly more area under cultivation 
compared to phase-2 and phase-3 districts (significant at 5% significance level)14. 
Also as seen in section (4.2.2), having basic financial inclusion i.e. a formal bank 
account increases the chances of having a loan from formal source. All these factors 
indicate that it would be interesting to see if having longer access to guaranteed 
employment have a positive effect on access to formal credit? This will be my first 
hypothesis. 
Talking about loans from informal sources, we can observe from section (4.2.2) that 
informal loans are mainly used to stabilize expenditure shocks (for health and 
household consumption). With increase in household income from participating in 
MGNREGA, the expenditure shocks are likely to be less severe and could be financed 
out of increased income. This indicates that with longer participation in MGNREGA a 
household should depend less on informal sources of credit and hence should borrow 
less. There is another side of dynamics of informal credit market. It is often argued 
that informal lending depends on screening of borrower’s repayment capability by 
moneylender on the basis of observable economic variables in a household (Aleem 
1993). Increased income of a participating household should signal a better repayment 
capability to moneylender and she may be willing to ration more credit in favor of 
that household (lend more money at similar interest rates as before). In this case, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  T-test not reported. 
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increased income from longer participation might result in more borrowings from 
informal sources.  
To determine which effect dominates, one needs information on density of informal 
lenders in a village (signaling competition between informal lenders) and various 
variables capturing their screening procedures, which are not present in ATF data. 
Absence of detailed data on penetration of informal lenders and indicators of their 
screening does not allow me to do a detailed analysis on effect of longer participation 
on informal borrowings. My second hypothesis would be to see how does longer 
access to employment guarantee effects borrowings from informal sources? 
The sample of data is restricted to only households participating in MGNREGA so 
that I can segregate households those who are not participating in MGNREGA and 
are likely to be relatively economically well off (see analysis of section 4.2.2), and 
can analyze the effect of longer access to MGNREGA. I will estimate a reduced form 
regression model separately for loans from formal and informal sources and will 
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4.4 Econometric Issues 	  
In this section, I will discuss potential econometric issues and how I have attempted to 
deal with them in my analysis. Also I will discuss methods and specifications used in 
analysis to ensure robustness of the results. 
The first issue is of cross-section nature of data and examining results, which focus on 
dynamic nature of MGNREGA. The selection of districts in the scheme was not 
random. As seen in section 2, 200 most economically backward districts were chosen 
to participate in first phase of the program. Apart from the non-random geographical 
selection at the first stage, self-selection into the scheme is contingent on economic 
status of a household. Economically well off households are likely to have higher 
opportunity cost of participating in MGNREGA whereas poor households might have 
lower or no opportunity cost of participating, hence they will participate.  Therefore, 
phase-wise implementation of MGNREGA, in some ways is determined by the 
outcome of interest (number and amount of loans), which itself signifies the economic 
status of a household. 
Given this endogenous nature of the participation; it was not possible to conduct 
Instrumental-Variable (IV) estimation, using phase-wise implementation as 
instruments. However, controlling for a large set of household level control variables 
relating to economic status of household15 in a reduced form regression equation will 
be a productive step towards controlling for the endogeneity. Controlling for a range 
of time variant (economic) and invariant (characteristics like caste, education etc.) 
observables will ensure that phase-wise implementation is exogenous to the outcome 
of interest. Also, to account for differences in districts, based on which they were 
included in various phases of implementation; I have separately estimated each 
regression specification, controlling for these district fixed effects.  
Omitted variable bias is another issue that is common for most cross-section studies. 
However, controlling for a large set of household level control variables will ensure 
that all deterministic variables are included in the model. To test and control for non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Assets like landholdings, savings and other assets within the premises of household.	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linear relation between dependent and independent variables, I have also controlled 
for squared values of continuous independent variables measuring the asset holdings 
of a household. There might be heterogeneous impact of MGNREGA participation 
for groups of different caste and religion participating in different phases. To control 
for it, I have also included various interactions of caste and religion dummies with 
various continuous variables16. Estimation results were found to be unaffected by 
squared continuous variables and other dummy interactions, which were not reported 
in tables due to space constraint. 
Another important issue is about value of dependent variable in the specifications17 I 
have analyzed. Various households in sample have not taken any loans; therefore 
significant numbers of observations in dependent variable are zero. In this case, a 
linear reduced form model would not fit the data well. Instead I have used Poisson 
based Pseudo-Maximum-Likelihood (PPML), suggested by (Silva and Tenreyo 
2006). PPML is developed for achieving consistency in constant-elasticity models in 
presence of heteroscedasticity but is also relevant for cases where dependant variable 









 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  These interactions included, caste/religion*landholdings, caste/religion*savings, 
caste/religion*monthly consumption expenditure etc.   
17 For the case of loans from formal sources.	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4.5 Estimation and Results 	  
I will use reduced form regression to estimate the effect of longer participation in 
MGNREGA on access to formal and informal credit in AP. The idea is that, the 
longer one has been participating in the program the more secure and higher her/his 
income is. Data is restricted to participants in program and for the loans taken in 
period 2006-2009. I will regress ‘amount of formal/informal loans’ received on 
dummy for phase-1 and phase-2 (with phase-3 as base category). Considering the 
issue of ‘endogeneity’ as discussed in section (4.4), I will control for aggregate 
amount of informal savings by a household (savings at home, with friends and 
neighbors etc.), formal savings in various bank accounts and for a breadth of 
household control variables like, assets (landholdings, jewelry and other small assets 
like pressure cooker, fan, cooking energy source, mobile phone, sewing machine, 
almirah etc.) and also for various household characteristics like caste, religion, level 
of education and gender of household head. I will also control for consumption 
expenditure of a household in past 30 days of survey, number of non-routine 
expenditure they had to incur (for festivals, marriage and other expenditure shocks 
which are not periodic in nature) and size of these non-routine expenditures. 
In another specification, I will look at amount of formal/informal borrowings only in 
year 2009, when three years have passed since the implementation of MGNREGA 
and all phases have been implemented. It will allow me to see the effect of the length 
of access to program on formal/informal credit when all households have had at least 
some period of access to employment guarantee. Apart from all other controls 
mentioned in first specification, I will control for amount of loans outstanding before 
2009. This will allow me to control for already existing liabilities, which might have 
an effect on borrowings in year 2009.  
In case of informal borrowings, the number of times a household borrows indicates 
their need of informal loans for stabilizing their expenditure needs. To analyze this 
factor, I will have also estimate the same specification as explained above, with 
‘number of informal loans taken loans took in past 6 months’ before survey, as 
variable of outcome of interest. 
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These specifications are estimated separately with and without district fixed effects. 
Including district fixed effects will control for fundamental differences between 
economic status of a district, depending on which a household might or might not get 
longer access to the program18. If longer access to MGNREGA had a positive effect 
on income stability and agricultural productivity then coefficient on dummy for first 
phase should be positive for the case of formal loans. In case of informal loans, if 
longer access to MGNREGA helped in stabilizing consumption shocks, then 
coefficient on dummy for initial phase should be negative. The models to be 
estimated for both specifications and for both formal and informal sources of 
borrowings are as follows: 
(AMTFOR/INFOR)i = αi + β1 (P1) + β2 (P2)+β3(Exp)i +β4(NR-EXPN)i +β5(NR-EXPS)i 
                               + β6(SaveInfor)i+ β7 (SaveFor)i + β8 (C)i +β9 (L)i+β10 (R)i +β11(G)i 
                                +β12[HH]i +β13[DFE] + εi                                        (4) 
Where, (AMTFOR/INFOR) is the amount of formal/informal loans received in period 
2006-2009; (NR-EXPN) is the number of non-routine expenditures incurred by 
household in past 6 months before the survey; (NR-EXPS) is the amount of 
corresponding non-routine expenditures by household and (SaveFor) is the amount of 
savings in formal savings accounts. 
(AMTF-2009)i     = αi + β1 (P1) + β2 (P2) )+β3(AMTB-2009)i +β4(Exp)i+β5 (NR-EXPN)i 
                             +β6 (NR-EXPS)i+ β8(SaveInfor)i+ β9 (SaveFor)i + β10 (C)i +β11 (L)i 
                             +β12(R)i +β13(G)I +β14[HH]i +β15 [DFE] + εi        (5) 
Where, (AMTF-2009) is amount of formal loans received in year 2009 and (AMTB-2009) 
is the amount of formal loan outstanding before 2009. 
(NUMINFOR)i      = αi + β1 (P1) + β2 (P2)+β3(Exp)i +β4(NR-EXPN)i +β5(NR-EXPS)i 
                               + β6(SaveInfor)i+ β7 (SaveFor)i + β8 (C)i +β9 (L)i+β10 (R)i +β11(G)i 
                               +β12[HH]i +β13[DFE] + εi                                         (6) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  200 most economically vulnerable districts in India were selected for first phase.	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Where, (NUMINFOR) is the number of informal loans taken in past 6 months before the 
survey. 
Model (4) & (5) are estimated separately for formal and informal borrowings, with 
and without district fixed effects. Model (6) is estimated only for the case of informal 
borrowings, with and without district fixed effects. All other variables, which are not 
explained above, are same as those used in estimation of models (1), (2) and (3) in 
previous section.  
All specifications for the case of loans from formal sources are estimated using 
Poisson based pseudo-maximum-likelihood (PPML), for which all the continuous 
(containing non-zero observations) independent variables are logged and dependant 
variable is rescaled19 (See section 4.4) 
-Results 
Table 11 shows results of estimating model (4) and (5) for formal loans without 
controlling for district fixed effects. For aggregate amount of loans received in 2006-
2009, the coefficient on dummy for phase-1 i.e. (P1) is positive and significant at 5% 
level of significance, while dummy for phase-2 (P2) is negative and insignificant. For 
amount of loans received in year 2009, the coefficient on phase-1 dummy is positive 
and significant (at 1% level of significance), while the coefficient on dummy for 
phase-2 is positive but insignificant.  
These results indicate that aggregate access to credit increases with longer access to 
employment guarantee. These results do not control for difference in districts, hence 
should not be interpreted without further investigation. Table 12 reports estimation of 
model (4) & (5), controlling for district fixed effects. Results are observed to be 
consistent. Dummy for phase-1 is positive and significant for both aggregate 
borrowings and borrowings in 2009 (at 1% level of significance)20. It is observed that 
participating in phase-1 of implementation increases aggregate formal borrowings by 
around Rs. 10,000 (with phase-3 as base category); which is not at all a trivial amount 
for poor households in rural India. This increase is almost double for loans received in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Dividing by 10,000.	  20	  Dummy for phase-2 is dropped in regression due to collinearity with one of dummies for district 
fixed effects.  Hence, the base category is dummy for rollout phase-3.  
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2009; when 3 years of program are completed. It can also be seen that land under 
agricultural cultivation does have a positive (and significant at 0.1% level) effect on 
access to formal credit; 1 acre of increase in land under agriculture leads to an 
increase in formal loans by Rs 1640. Also, as seen in section 4.3, phase-1 participants 
have larger landholdings as compared to phase-2 and phase-3 participants. Hence, 
these results provide evidence for my hypothesis that having longer access to 
employment guarantee might have a positive impact on access to credit from formal 
sources; and this works through the channel of increase in agricultural productivity. 
To control for heterogeneity in effects of program on households from different caste 
and religion, I have tested the robustness of these results for various interactions of 
variables measuring assets of a household with caste and religion of household. These 
interactions do not affect the results significantly and are not reported due to space 
constraint.  
Moving to loans from informal sources, Table 13 reports the results from estimation 
of model (4), (5) and (6) without controlling for district fixed effects. None of the 
coefficients on dummy for phase-1 and phase-2 are significant. It is interesting to 
observe that size of non-routine expenditure has a positive and significant effect on 
amount and number of informal loans. This provides evidence that households depend 
on informal sources mainly for financing the expenditures out of an economic shock 
(represented by non-routine expenditures).  
Same as case of formal loans, these results should not be interpreted without 
controlling for district fixed effects. Table 14 reports estimation of model (4), (5) & 
(6), controlling for district level fixed effects. Results are observed to be more 
consistent across all three models. Coefficients on dummy for phase-1 are positive but 
not significant for all of the three models21. It is again observed that size of non-
routine expenditure has a significant positive effect on amount and number of 
informal borrowings (it ranges from increase of Rs. 0.40-Rs. 0.44 for every Rs. 1 
increase in size of non-routine payments). These results suggest that there are no 
strong effects of longer access to guaranteed employment on informal loans. 
However, positive coefficient on dummy for phase-1 suggests that longer access to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Dummy for phase-2 is dropped in regression due to collinearity with one of dummies for district 
fixed effects.  Hence, the base category is dummy for rollout phase-3. 
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guaranteed employment might allow households to signal a better repayment 




















	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 To estimate a more precise effect of longer access to employment on informal loans, a diversified set 
of variables measuring structure, penetration and screening procedures of lenders should be controlled 
for. 
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5. LIMITATIONS 	  
There are two main limitation of this study imposed by lack of some data. First, there 
is no information of aggregate household income or income from MGNREGA in the 
ATF survey data hence I am not able to control for those incomes in my regressions. 
It would have been interesting to know the income elasticity of formal/informal 
borrowings and find separate elasticities with respect to aggregate household income 
and income from MGNREGA. It would give a better idea of how access to 
formal/informal loans respond to more wages earned from longer participation in 
MGNREGA. I tried to match households in ATF data to the income data of same 
households in aggregate MGNREGA data. Job card numbers of households are not 
recorded properly in the ATF survey and hence could not be directly matched to those 
in MGNREGA data. I used a name-matching algorithm adapted to stata by Election 
Commission of India23 that matches phonetic sound of ‘hindi’ names, but this 
procedure did not give good results. Given time and resource constraints, it was not 
possible for me to match names manually or look for an alternative method. 
Secondly, absence of a baseline data of surveyed households does not allow me to 
present a clear picture of differences in access to credit before and after the program 
has been implemented. It would be more informative to know how access to credit for 
households responds to implementation of the program and then to the length of 
participation in the program.  
Given these constraints on data, I have tried to control for as many observables as 
possible in my regressions. Wherever appropriate I have used variables that are not 
expected to change overtime to estimate participation in program, effects of longer 
participation etc. Other than that I have done a vast literature survey to look for 
variables like caste, religion, education etc., which to some extent may proxy for 
economic status of a household for the cases I am using. Also, by controlling for a 
large breadth of household assets and their interactions with caste, religion dummies, 
I have attempted to control for economic status of a household, as closely as possible. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  This code (“amin” in stata) matches phonetic sound of hindi names at a preset level of precision. 
See <http://eci.nic.in/DevForum/Source_Code/Name_Suggestor.txt> 
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6. CONCLUSION 	  
EGS have been advocated for providing safety nets to poor population in a developing 
economy through their mechanism of self-selection of poor and providing them a 
guaranteed minimum level of livelihood security. As observed in section 3, EGS have 
been an effective tool to provide income security and enhance productivity of existing 
work opportunities. By increasing productivity of existing economic opportunities 
and through income earned by participating in EGS, a poor household might be able 
to borrow more against their future and hence, will be able to stabilize the effect of 
various economic shocks. This study uses data from a comprehensive survey of 
access to various financial services for a sample of households in rural India along 
with the data of participation in MGNREGA for the same sample to investigate, if 
participating in EGS (MGNREGA in this study) has a positive impact on access to 
credit for poor households. 
Findings from this study provide evidence that longer participation in PWP under 
EGS enables economically backward households to borrow more from formal 
sources. This study highlights some important features of MGNREGA, which enables 
a typical EGS to have a multidimensional positive impact on lives of rural poor, 
including better access to formal credit. It is observed that MGNREGA has been 
successful in efficiently targeting rural poor, which ensures the availability of transfer 
benefits only for the targeted population. Also, MGNREGA has been successful in 
developing an initial link between financial institutions and financially excluded poor 
population by disbursing wages through bank/post office accounts. It is observed in 
this paper that, already existing link between banks and poor households has helped 
them in getting formal credit. MGNREGA had a positive impact on agricultural 
productivity (as seen in section 3) and this is evident by larger landholdings for 
households, who are participating longer in the program (see section 4). With 
increasing productivity of the prime source of livelihood for rural households, they 
are encouraged and are able to invest more in their farms by borrowing from formal 
sources. 
This study provides empirical evidence for policymakers involved in designing public 
work programs for having multidimensional impact on tackling poverty. It shows that 
with efficient targeting mechanism and flexibility in an EGS, poor participants can 
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come out of poverty trap by better stabilizing the economic shocks and greater access 
to formal credit. However, findings from this study must be carefully interpreted 
before generalizing for different circumstances and geographical locations. This study 
uses sample from few districts of a state in India, which has distinct economic 
features in comparison to any other state in India or any other location around the 
world. It must also be noted that for a program like MGREGA to have sustained 
positive impact, it should be scrutinized periodically at implementation and budgetary 
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APPENDIX A: TABLES 
	  	  	  	  	  	  
Table 1- Districts in MGNREGA (Andhra Pradesh) 
!
  
Table 2- Difference in Average number of days per household (phase-wise) 
 
Comparison Year Difference in 
Phases 
Difference [Average no. of 
days per household] 
2007 Phase I – Phase II 22.72*** 
2008 Phase I – Phase III 33.27*** 
2008 Phase II  - Phase III 22.76*** 




Table 3- Difference in Average amount (Rs.) per household (phase-wise) 
 
Comparison Year Difference in 
Phases 
Difference [Average amount 
(Rs.) per household] 
2007 Phase I – Phase II 1730.50*** 
2008 Phase I – Phase III 2694.90*** 
2008 Phase II  - Phase III 1976.30*** 


















District in Phase-III 
(year 2008)!
1. ADILABAD 1. NELLORE 1. WEST GODAVARI 
2. ANANTAPUR 2. EAST GODAVARI 2. KRISHNA 
3. CHITTOR 3. SRIKAKULAM 3. VISHAKHAPATNAM 
4. CUDDAPAH 4. KURNOOL ! !
5. KARIMNAGAR 5. PRAKASAM ! !
6. KHAMMAM 6. GUNTUR ! !
7. MAHBUBNAGAR ! ! ! !
8. MEDAK ! ! ! !
9. NALGONDA ! ! ! !
10. NIZAMABAD ! ! ! !
11. RANGAREDDI ! ! ! !
12. VIZIANAGARAM ! ! ! !
13. WARANGAL ! ! ! !
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Table 4- Caste wise distribution of households 
 
 Aggregate Data Only MGNREGA 
participants 
Caste Number of 
Households 
Percentage 




of total (%) 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 404 21 254 27 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 147 8 89 8 
Other Backward Caste (OBC) 912 48 449 48 
Most Backward Caste 77 4 30 3 
General 382 20 114 12 
 
 
Table 6- Usage of Formal/Informal loans 
 




Buying agriculture machinery or input 59 19 
Repaying old debt 13 7 
Health expenditure 11 25 
Household consumption 28 27 
 
 
Table 7- Reasons for not taking a Formal loan 
 
Reason for not taking loan Percentage of total responses 
Loan application rejected 11 
No idea about loan products 20 




Table 8- Reasons for not taking an Informal loan 
 
Reason for not taking loan Percentage of total responses 
Higher interest rates 7 
Irregular income flow 41 















Table 5- Probit of Participation in MGNREGA 
Method: Probit 
(1) 
Participating in MGNREGA 
(dummy) 
(2) 
Participating in MGNREGA and in phase-1 
(dummy) 
Dummy for lower caste 0.411*** 0.592*** 
 (5.55) (6.58) 
Can read but not write 0.123 -0.200 
 (0.60) (-0.81) 
Can write but not read 0.472 0.991 
 (1.21) (1.60) 
Signature only 0.492*** 0.515*** 
 (5.90) (5.40) 
Cannot read and write 0.390*** 0.390*** 
 (5.67) (4.87) 
Muslim -0.626*** -0.691*** 
 (-3.56) (-3.49) 
Christian 0.0181 0.0284 
 (0.13) (0.15) 
Phase-1 0.867*** - 
 (7.10) - 
Phase-2 0.533*** - 
 (4.39) - 
Constant -1.153*** -0.434*** 
 (-10.83) (-3.66) 
N 1922 1444 
t statistics in parentheses 


















Table 4- Caste wise distribution of households 
 
 Aggregate Data Only MGNREGA 
participants 
Caste Number of 
Households 
Percentage 




of total (%) 
Scheduled Caste (SC) 404 21 254 27 
Scheduled Tribe (ST) 147 8 89 8 
Other Backward Caste (OBC) 912 48 449 48 
Most Backward Caste 77 4 30 3 
General 382 20 114 12 
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Reason for not taking loan Percentage of total responses 
Loan application rejected 11 
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Table 8- Reasons for not taking an Informal loan 
 
Reason for not taking loan Percentage of total responses 
Higher interest rates 7 
Irregular income flow 41 













Table 9- Reasons for not taking a formal Bank Account 
 
Percentage of total responses Reason for not taking a formal Bank 
account Aggregate Data Only MGNREGA 
participants 
Not enough money to save in Bank Account 10 4 
Do not want/need a Bank Account 5 - 
No information about Bank Accounts 7 3 








       Figure 1- Average days per year (By Implementation Phase) 
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Table 10- Probit of receiving a formal loan 
Method: Probit (1) Have a formal loan outstanding (dummy) 




Consumption exp. (Rs.) 0.0000352* 
 (2.15) 
Landholdings (Acres) 0.172*** 
 (11.00) 














Gender (female) -0.527*** 
 (-5.07) 
Can read but not write 0.0484 
 (0.22) 
Can write but not read -0.987 
 (-1.68) 
Signature only 0.113 
 (1.27) 





t statistics in parentheses 






























Table 11- Model (4) & (5) for formal borrowings [Without district fixed effects] 
 
Method: Poisson based Pseudo maximum 
likelihood 
(1) 
Agg. Amt. Received  
(Rs.) 
(2) 
Amt. Received in 2009 
(Rs.) 
Phase-1 0.733* 1.656** 
 (2.10) (2.64) 
Phase-2 -0.147 0.0385 
 (-0.32) (0.04) 
Log [consumption expenditure (Rs.)] -0.0932 0.0348 
 (-0.53) (0.17) 
Log [No. of non-routine payments] 0.182 0.111 
 (1.44) (0.70) 
Log [size of non-routine payments (Rs.)] 0.175** 0.374*** 
 (2.98) (4.78) 
Land under agriculture [Acres] 0.171*** 0.229*** 
 (5.64) (6.00) 
Savings (Informal) (Rs.) -0.000124 -0.000113 
 (-1.57) (-1.03) 
Savings (Formal) (Rs.) 0.0000315 0.0000424 
 (1.59) (1.33) 
Muslim 1.210 1.777** 
 (1.84) (2.70) 
Christian 0.845* 1.124*** 
 (2.53) (3.37) 
Can read but not write -0.0745 -0.516 
 (-0.18) (-0.83) 
Signature only -0.177 -0.0955 
 (-0.98) (-0.39) 
Cannot read and write -0.274 -0.443* 
 (-1.67) (-2.01) 
Female -0.405 -0.342 
 (-1.53) (-0.90) 
ST 0.0357 0.329 
 (0.13) (1.08) 
OBC 0.369* 0.168 
 (2.06) (0.72) 
Most backward caste 0.616 -0.340 
 (1.49) (-0.41) 
General 0.789** 0.422 
 (2.91) (1.40) 
Agriculture as income source 0.253 0.288 
 (1.13) (0.85) 
Amount outstanding before 2009 (Rs.)  -0.0000353** 
  (-2.66) 
Constant -2.995 -7.458*** 
 (-1.92) (-3.95) 
N 772 772 
t statistics in parentheses 















Table 12- Model (4) & (5) for formal borrowings [controlling for district fixed 
effects] 
Method: Poisson based Pseudo maximum 
likelihood 
(1) 
Agg. Amt. Received  
(Rs.) 
(2) 
Amt. Received in 2009 
(Rs.) 
Phase-1 1.093** 1.940** 
 (2.63) (2.93) 
Phase-2 -0.190 0.00850 
 (-0.41) (0.01) 
Log [consumption expenditure (Rs.)] -0.0634 0.153 
 (-0.34) (0.61) 
Log [No. of non-routine payments] 0.200 0.116 
 (1.43) (0.75) 
Log [size of non-routine payments (Rs.)] 0.170* 0.380*** 
 (2.51) (4.39) 
Land under agriculture [Acres] 0.164*** 0.230*** 
 (5.03) (5.89) 
Savings (Informal) (Rs.) -0.000167* -0.000201 
 (-1.98) (-1.75) 
Savings (Formal) (Rs.) 0.0000351 0.0000542 
 (1.63) (1.58) 
Muslim 1.167 1.726** 
 (1.72) (2.67) 
Christian 0.892** 1.068** 
 (2.62) (3.03) 
Can read but not write -0.227 -0.453 
 (-0.48) (-0.74) 
Signature only -0.192 -0.0259 
 (-1.01) (-0.09) 
Cannot read and write -0.288 -0.449* 
 (-1.82) (-2.00) 
Female -0.445 -0.303 
 (-1.71) (-0.87) 
ST 0.0345 0.295 
 (0.13) (1.00) 
OBC 0.421* 0.142 
 (2.28) (0.57) 
Most backward caste 0.804 -0.0808 
 (1.92) (-0.10) 
General 0.827** 0.354 
 (2.84) (1.21) 
Agriculture as income source 0.180 0.203 
 (0.77) (0.58) 
Amount outstanding before 2009 (Rs.) - -0.0000350** 
 - (-2.67) 
Constant -3.039 -8.228*** 
 (-1.81) (-3.75) 
N 772 772 
 
t statistics in parentheses 













Table 13- Model (4), (5) & (6) for Informal borrowings [without district fixed 
effects] 
Method: Reduced form 
regression 
(1) 
Agg. Amt. received 
(Rs.) 
(2) 
Amt. received in 2009 
(Rs.) 
(3) 
No. of outstanding 
loans in past 6 months 
Phase-1 11081.7 10446.7 -0.255 
 (0.40) (0.97) (-0.87) 
Phase-2 24844.1 24694.8 -0.474 
 (0.69) (1.03) (-1.29) 
Consumption Expenditure 
(Rs.) -1.670 -1.901 0.0000764
* 
 (-1.25) (-1.37) (1.97) 
No. of non-routine 
expenditures -111.4 370.2 0.235
*** 
 (-0.11) (0.42) (4.03) 
Size of non-routine 
expenditures (Rs.) 0.376
* 0.442* 0.0000108*** 
 (2.10) (2.38) (5.61) 
Land holding (Acres.) -2221.1 -2187.8 0.000784 
 (-1.09) (-1.13) (0.25) 
Savings (Informal) (Rs.) -2.650 -5.123 0.00000408 
 (-0.41) (-1.24) (0.07) 
Savings (Formal) (Rs.) 0.242 -0.437 -0.0000180 
 (0.27) (-0.85) (-0.65) 
Muslim -46128.0 -43885.8 -0.125 
 (-1.46) (-1.34) (-0.30) 
Christian 4470.5 8869.1 -0.0401 
 (0.40) (0.81) (-0.15) 
Can read but not right 21125.5 -1642.4 -0.268 
 (1.20) (-0.19) (-0.84) 
Can write but not read -24085.7 -4546.9 -0.345 
 (-1.28) (-0.28) (-0.84) 
Signature only -11958.9 -517.7 0.00958 
 (-1.28) (-0.08) (0.05) 
Cannot read or write -9739.9 1477.5 -0.201 
 (-1.01) (0.27) (-1.25) 
Female -1586.1 387.1 -0.0502 
 (-0.20) (0.06) (-0.24) 
ST 19874.1 11058.9 0.114 
 (1.91) (1.58) (0.47) 
OBC 20148.7* 11087.5 0.0825 
 (2.36) (1.67) (0.52) 
Most backward caste 17732.5 13738.3 0.287 
 (1.07) (1.35) (0.63) 
General 31782.9 12405.5 -0.0551 
 (1.69) (1.59) (-0.22) 
Agriculture as income source 15770.4 11432.2 0.0615 
 (1.67) (1.29) (0.32) 
Amount outstanding before 
2009 (Rs.)  0.00983  
  (0.21)  
Constant -22561.5 -29018.2 1.832*** 
 (-0.70) (-1.30) (3.53) 
N 179 179 644 
t statistics in parentheses 













Table 14- Model (4), (5) & (6) for informal borrowings (controlling for district      
fixed effects) 
Method: Reduced form 
regression 
(1) 
Agg. Amt. received 
(Rs.) 
(2) 
Amt. received in 2009 
(Rs.) 
(3) 
No. of outstanding loans in 
past 6 months 
Phase-1 19596.5 12594.6 0.132 
 (0.68) (1.02) (0.47) 
Phase-2 20774.3 22167.8 - 
 (0.59) (0.91) - 
Consumption Expenditure 
(Rs.) -1.604 -1.831 0.0000747 
 (-1.19) (-1.36) (1.87) 
No. of non-routine 
expenditures 213.1 654.5 0.237
*** 
 (0.26) (0.79) (4.23) 
Size of non-routine 
expenditures (Rs.) 0.397
* 0.442* 0.0000106*** 
 (2.23) (2.46) (5.46) 
Land holding (Acres.) -3545.1 -2736.9 -0.00241 
 (-1.79) (-1.47) (-0.68) 
Savings (Informal) (Rs.) -3.264 -8.015 -0.00000362 
 (-0.50) (-1.81) (-0.06) 
Savings (Formal) (Rs.) 0.0496 -0.811 -0.0000286 
 (0.05) (-1.32) (-1.01) 
Muslim -50404.8 -39519.5 -0.0935 
 (-1.61) (-1.31) (-0.21) 
Christian 9384.1 11256.0 -0.0255 
 (0.75) (1.10) (-0.09) 
Can read but not right 14950.2 -6693.8 -0.235 
 (0.82) (-0.83) (-0.76) 
Can write but not read -31480.6 -9409.8 -0.193 
 (-1.61) (-0.55) (-0.40) 
Signature only -13428.0 -1253.8 0.0428 
 (-1.43) (-0.20) (0.24) 
Cannot read or write -9739.7 1223.4 -0.179 
 (-0.97) (0.22) (-1.12) 
Female -228.7 4459.5 -0.0870 
 (-0.03) (0.66) (-0.42) 
ST 15145.2 5205.1 0.0108 
 (1.55) (0.73) (0.04) 
OBC 25449.4** 12610.0 0.0695 
 (2.73) (1.69) (0.43) 
Most backward caste 16082.2 10939.8 0.222 
 (0.95) (0.97) (0.49) 
General 31891.2 12898.5 -0.0947 
 (1.73) (1.73) (-0.39) 
Agriculture as income 
source 15180.8 8899.9 0.0546 
 (1.67) (1.02) (0.28) 
Amount outstanding before 
2009 (Rs.) - 0.0114 - 
 - (0.26) - 
Constant -16383.8 -23907.8 1.278** 
 (-0.52) (-1.08) (2.83) 
N 179 179 644 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 9- Reasons for not taking a formal Bank Account 
 
Percentage of total responses Reason for not taking a formal Bank 
account Aggregate Data Only MGNREGA 
participants 
Not enough money to save in Bank Account 10 4 
Do not want/need a Bank Account 5 - 
No information about Bank Accounts 7 3 








       Figure 1- Average days per year (By Implementation Phase) 
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                                        Figure 4- Average rainfall by Months (For phase-1 districts) 
 
 

















* Graph calculated using random sample of 5% of overall villages in phase 1 districts.
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